Unlikely to Ever Be the Same
by Hugh Rogers
On the twelfth of January, at the Charleston Civic Center, mining regulators from the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, and West Virginia’s Department of Environmental Protection addressed a crowd of more than a hundred coal industry executives. At the relentless urging of fellow Democrats from coal-producing states, the Obama administration was making another attempt to explain itself.
Industry’s howls of disbelief had not died down since the EPA announced last year that it would take a closer look at permits for mountaintop removal mines. It appeared that the agency might be intending to enforce the law.
That morning, the EPA’s Jeff Lapp recited the Clean Water Act’s requirement that stream impacts be minimized and that waters not be “significantly degraded.” He said permit reviewers would first inquire about alternative disposal areas. Could the coal operator avoid dumping overburden in streams? Then, reasonably assuming that companies would continue to plan for valley fills—after all, it’s much cheaper to push the rock into a hollow than pile it back on top or truck it somewhere else—Lapp said EPA would “sequence” valley fill permits. Further fill authorizations would depend on the results of stream monitoring below any approved fills.
“That may not be a palatable situation from your perspective, but from the agency’s perspective, I need to push back a little bit,” said Lapp. “Some of the things we’re looking for may not blend or mesh with what you originally received permits for.” That was a swipe at the profligate permit approvals of the previous administration, but note the qualifier, “a little bit.”
Perhaps the most telling remark that morning came from DEP’s mining director, Tom Clarke: “Things are unlikely to ever be the same. We don’t know quite where things are going to end up, but you can be assured in the future the surface mines that are permitted will be smaller.”
The week before, an alarm bell had rung. If heeded—if, indeed, the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act were to be enforced as written—the surface mines permitted would shrink to near invisibility.
The alarm came in the form of an authoritative, peer-reviewed paper, “Mountaintop Mining Consequences,” published in the journal, Science. The collaborative effort of a dozen scientists—biologists, hydrologists, ecologists, and more—the paper concluded, “Mining permits are being issued despite the preponderance of scientific evidence that impacts are pervasive and irreversible and that mitigation cannot compensate for the losses.” And just to be sure that the EPA, Office of Surface Mining, Corps of Engineers, and state agencies got the message, the authors added, “Regulators should no longer ignore rigorous science.”
That was the promise of the Obama administration. When EPA’s Jeff Lapp quoted the requirement that streams not be “degraded” by mining, he was purporting to rely on scientific standards. But the measurements have been done, the standards have been applied, the results are in for the hundreds of mountains and miles of streams that have already been destroyed, and there is absolutely no reason to believe that more mining can make it any better:
Mine-related contaminants persist in streams well below valley fills, forests are destroyed, headwater streams are lost, and biodiversity is reduced; all of these demonstrate that MTM/VF [i.e., mountaintop mining/valley fill] causes significant environmental damage despite regulatory requirements to minimize impacts.
Current mitigation strategies are meant to compensate for lost stream habitat and functions but do not; water-quality degradation caused by mining activities is neither prevented nor corrected during reclamation or mitigation.
The connection between damage to the natural environment and impact on human health is being made in a series of studies by one of the Science paper’s co authors, Michael Hendryx, a researcher at West Virginia University. One determined that residents of coal-mining communities were more likely to suffer chronic health problems; another considered the cost of increased mortality in those communities. It concluded, “The human cost of the Appalachian coal mining economy outweighs its economic benefits.”
Put another way, “Coal generates inexpensive electricity, but not as inexpensive as the price signals indicate because those prices do not include the costs to human health and productivity, and the costs of natural resource destruction.“
Even as the evidence continued to accumulate; even as the regulatory agencies paused, dithered, and pinched a few mines to reduce their impacts; there came another report, a week after the Charleston meeting, laying out the numbers on what we might call “peak coal.”
Rory McIlmoil and Evan Hansen of Morgantown-based Downstream Strategies, using statistics from the Department of Energy and other public sources, showed that Central Appalachian coal production had declined 20 percent since 1997—and was likely to drop another 50 percent by the end of this decade. And that projection did not take into account the potential effects of new climate change legislation, or the promised stricter enforcement of existing laws on mountaintop removal.
The factors driving this decline include competition from other coal-producing regions, rising interest in natural gas and renewable energy, and the depletion of Central Appalachia’s best reserves. Co-author Rory McIlmoil explained in this January 19 post on Ken Ward’s “Coal Tattoo” blog:
[Wyoming’s] Powder River Basin is gaining a greater share of national coal production every year, and as a source of low-sulfur coal, has been serving as an alternative to the higher-priced Central Appalachian coal. If coal producers in Central Appalachia could have prevented that by mining the coal at pre-2000 prices, they probably would have done so. Instead, the price of Central App coal has doubled in only eight years. That is the problem described in the report. The remaining coal, from year to year, has been more costly to mine, and projections show that this will continue to have a negative impact on coal production in the region, so much that production may be halved within the next decade . . .
Diversify! diversify! diversify! was the strategists’ point: counties (and states) dependent on coal must diversify their energy production and their broader economies NOW, and not because of any “war on coal” but because of coal’s approaching demise.
Depending on your point of view, these events set the stage for or overshadowed the Kennedy-Blankenship debate on January 21st. The aforementioned reporter/blogger Ken Ward was unenthusiastic: he heard nothing new or enlightening from the speakers. Others would argue that the point was to reach a wider audience. We’ll see about that.
By the way, I should say the real news about coal, day to day and year to year, appears, usually first and often exclusively, on “Coal Tattoo.” For instance, that January 12 meeting: “The event was planned as a private meeting for industry,” he wrote, “but after word of it was made public some other folks (myself included) showed up.” Count on Ken to show up. And to put what he hears in perspective.
As I write this, a week after the debate, “Coal Tattoo” has news that EPA is considering whether to undo the Bush Administration’s changes to the definition of “fill material” in Clean Water Act regulations. Another game-changer? Or just a trial balloon? It’s hard not to hang on every word, every tip, because the story is so important. For those who live in the coalfields, it’s a matter of life and death. This industry could pull everything down with it.